FT Alphaville > Greek debt: restructured

…Did anyone notice this weekend’s Greek debt restructuring?

FT Alphaville -> Greek debt: restructured

Nyrup går imod Rompuys europagt - Folkebevægelsen mod EU

. . . . ”I hele dette forløb er aftaler indgået af et meget lille antal personer. Man kan ikke sige, at dette har været en demokratisk proces, selvom det har enorme konsekvenser for den sociale velfærd og for demokratiet. Der er et reelt behov for åbenhed, for at lade befolkningerne komme til orde,” sagde formanden for PES i den anledning.

- Måske skulle de danske socialdemokrater lytte til deres europæiske formand og kræve en folkeafstemning om EU virkelig skal have mere magt til at tryne almindelige lønmodtagere og andet godtfolk, siger Folkebevægelsens MEP Søren Søndergaard på sin blog. . . . 

Krækja: Nyrup går imod Rompuys europagt - Folkebevægelsen mod EU

BBC - Newsnight: Paul Mason: How do you leave the Euro? Plan C: odious debt...

BBC

"I once used to frequent a very decent restaurant on Kefalonia where you could get lobster pasta for 1700 drachmas. In the summer of 2002 I was stunned to find, chalked on the very same board in the very same harbour, that lobster pasta was now to cost 17 euros. In fact the old zeros were still faintly visible, but not the drachma sign.

The final exchange rate of the Greek drachma was 340/1, making the pre-Euro lobster a notional 5 euros - so this was a > 3x increase. But on adoption of the Euro the restaurant had simply decided it had entered the north-European economy and would now charge north-European prices. I have to say, it was still worth it - but it was a shock.

Soon Greeks may experience a shock in the other direction."

Krækja: BBC - Newsnight: Paul Mason: How do you leave the Euro? Plan C: odious debt...

Council on Foreign Relations - Sovereign Credibility and Bank Runs

Mikilvægt

"In the midst of the financial crisis of 2008, governments helped to prevent bank runs by guaranteeing bank debts. Yet as sovereign solvency itself becomes an issue, such guarantees quickly lose their value. If Ireland provides a rule of thumb, bank runs can be expected once sovereign credit default swap yields pass 3%. The figure above shows that when Irish government CDS yields first passed 3% in early 2009, foreign deposits fled the country. This happened again in late 2010. Now that Spanish CDS yields have broken the 3% threshold, there is reason to be concerned about the stability of Spanish bank deposits as well."

Krækja á bloggfærslu Council on Foreign Relations : Geo-Graphics - Blog Archive - Sovereign Credibility and Bank Runs

The Absolute Return Letter March 2011

Nýjasta bréfið frá Niels C. Jensen hjá ARP - mars 2011

. . . In reality, though, the Irish have a stronger hand than generally perceived. With their banks sinking faster than other European investors can offload their exposure to Ireland, what would Ireland actually lose from calling the EU’s bluff and let bondholders take a haircut? Perhaps even walk away from the euro and go back to the punt? Usually, one of the strongest arguments against leaving a currency union is the inevitable run on the banks. But if the bank run is already in full bloom, that argument loses much of its power . . .

. . . After all, the EU’s main concern is not Ireland. No, what the EU is desperate to maintain is the illusion that the EU’s banking sector in general, and Germany’s in particular, is sound and healthy. In reality, the German landesbanks, together with the Spanish cajas and the Austrian banks, are amongst the weakest in Europe in terms of their capital base, and the German banks have plenty of exposure to Ireland . . .

Sækja bréfið (PDF) hjá Absolute Return Partners LLP

German Economic Policy and the Euro 1999 - 2010

The aim of this paper is to assess to what extent Germany - whether by accident or design - has been a beneficiary of the Euro era, and what negative impact, if any, there has been on the Eurozone’s smaller economies.

Analysis shows that trade imbalances within the Eurozone centre upon Germany, the most important economy, and by far the largest exporting nation. Germany has substantial trade and current account surpluses with the other Eurozone members. In the last three recorded years for example, it was €114.3 billion in 2007, and €104.5 billion and €79.7 billion in the recession years of 2008 and 2009 respectively.

This situation is greatly exacerbated by the ECB’s exchange rate policy which (wittingly or not) favours German interests. This is because, at the outset, the German people gave up their beloved D-Mark under an implicit agreement that EMU would never lead to inflation in their country. For this reason the European Central Bank tightens monetary policy whenever the German economy is in danger of over-heating, regardless of the needs of the Mediterranean economies.

When the Euro was founded in 1999, it was fondly assumed that with Germany’s exchange rate ‘irrevocably fixed’, then there would be no more periodic crises such as those which repeatedly afflicted the ERM between 1979 and 1992. The ruling elite, now in total control, could sit back smugly anticipating economic convergence and the facilitation of political union, however ill-defined this concept is and no matter how unwanted.

It was never going to happen like this. Rather, German exchange rate policy, within the Euro, represents the most lethal danger to the survivability of the Single Currency. The fundamental reason for this is stark in its simplicity.

The Bruges Group - krækja:  German Economic Policy and the Euro 1999 − 2010 | PDF-skjal

Europe’s growing prosperity gap Outside the Box - MarketWatch

"The Franco-German plan, which would force members of the European Union to coordinate many social and economic policies like retirement ages and debt limits that have traditionally been dictated by individual nations, was immediately panned by the zone’s smaller countries. France and Germany have since signaled a willingness to address some of the concerns of their European brethren.

As they work out the details, European leaders must recognize that simply restoring the balance sheets of the continent’s ailing economies will not save the euro zone. If EU policy makers are to have any hope of preserving the common currency, they must also address Europe’s prosperity gap."

Krækja; Europe’s growing prosperity gap Outside the Box - MarketWatch

Landsframleiðsla Danmerkur dróst saman á síðasta ársfjórðungi 2010

Samdráttur í Danmörku á ný.

Bruttonationalproduktet (BNP) faldt med 0,4 pct. i fjerde kvartal, når der korrigeres for prisudvikling og sæsonbevægelser. Det private forbrug og investeringerne voksede, mens det offentlige forbrug og samhandlen med udlandet bidrog negativt til udviklingen i BNP. Den negative kvartalsvækst kommer efter fem kvartaler med posi- tiv vækst. Således var BNP 2,7 pct. højere end niveauet i fjerde kvartal 2009. For 2010 som helhed er vækstraten i BNP opgjort til 2,1 pct.

Krækja: DST (PDF)

EPN: Uventet nedtur for dansk økonomi
Børsen: Choktal for dansk økonomi
Børsen: 1000: Fyringer i det offentlige sænker væksten

Atvinnuleysi í sameinaðri Ítalíu og í "transfer-union". Norður-Suður

Mezzogiorno í járngreipum 50 ára stöðnunar í "Transfer-union" segir SESIfo hér: Studying the cost of Greece leaving the euro

Open Europe blog: Studying the cost of Greece leaving the euro

"The 'European Economic Advisory Group', CESifo, is a joint venture by two of Germany's most respected research institutions. Earlier in the week, it published an interesting report examining the various potential policy responses to the eurozone crisis.

One of the authors is CESifo Director and heavyweight economist Dr. Hans-Werner Sinn (pictured). When he speaks, Germany listens.

Here are some of the key points in the report:

On establishing a permanent "transfer union" - in which taxpayers in stronger economies subsidise weaker countries, such as happened between Western and Eastern Germany - the report notes:

The persistent flow of public funds has in the end helped eastern Germany only a little, if at all. It has made it another European Mezzogiorno – a region stuck in a low-development equilibrium.

(...)

Whether the EU budget should be expanded for this purpose is a distributional question that will have to be decided by the political process. Politicians should not overlook, however, that there is the risk of Greece becoming addicted to the transfers, since it seems to have become addicted to the capital flows of the past.

It warns against the harmonisation of wages across the EU, citing regional differences in Italy as an example:

The Italian Mezzogiorno has been caught in such an equilibrium for half a century and more. Its GDP per capita is about 60 percent of that of the rest of Italy and does not show any sign of convergence. In Italy, the causes for this situation can be sought in a common wage policy, mainly dictated by the conditions of the North, which has always resulted in wages that were way too high for the South and resulted in persistent mass unemployment.

The under-development has forced the state to help out with transfers from the North. These transfers have provided an alternative income source in the South to which the political system and the economy have grown accustomed, perpetuating the situation, as it seems, even more.

They also explore the alternative to a transfer union - devaluation . . . . .

Lesa áfram - krækja: Open Europe blog: Studying the cost of Greece leaving the euro

Bein krækja á skýrslu CESifo; Skýrsla CESifo

ekathimerini.com | Ireland, Greece: brothers in arms?

"The past week provided two very different expressions of citizens’ frustrations in Greece and Ireland, the two members of the European Union at the forefront of the year-long sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone.

While Irish voters in Dublin, Cork and Limerick went to the polls, Greek citizens in Athens, Thessaloniki and Patra vented their anger by staging a week of industrial action, culminating in Wednesday’s 24-hour nationwide general strike. While people voted with their hands in one country, citizen exercised their rights with their feet and fists in the other."

Krækja - gríska Kathimerini: ekathimerini.com | Ireland, Greece: brothers in arms?:

How Germany Became the China of Europe - TIME

"Some 80% of Germany's trade surplus is with the rest of the European Union. The more German industry excels, the more other Europeans feel that Germany's success comes at their expense, cracking open schisms within the euro zone just when the region can least afford them. 'There is frustration with Germany,' says André Sapir, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank. 'Germany is moving ahead, but what are they doing for the rest of Europe? . . .

Krækja: How Germany Became the China of Europe - TIME

AFP: Europe races to meet 'Mad March' debt deadline

"Eurozone paymaster Germany won't guarantee its backing unless Berlin wins concessions on how other nations govern their finances first. Germany, supported by France, wants to reform everything from pensions to business taxation across the 17-nation eurozone in particular. . . .

Krækja: AFP: Europe races to meet 'Mad March' debt deadline

The creaking European austerity machine | Red Pepper

"Austerity could spell the end for the euro, argues Leigh Phillips" . . .

Krækja; The creaking European austerity machine | Red Pepper

The Euro Zone's Bumpy Road to Recovery - WSJ.com

"In the pre-euro era, they would devalue their currencies to make German goods dearer and their homemade stuff cheaper. That was then and this is now. No such mechanism is available to struggling Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain or Italy—they gave up the ability to revalue their currencies when they ditched them in favor of the euro." . . .

Krækja á grein Irwin Stelzer á Wall Street Journal: The Euro Zone's Bumpy Road to Recovery - WSJ.com:

Finns Threaten Debt Bailout Plan as Election Nears: Euro Credit - Businessweek

"Feb. 28 (Bloomberg) -- Finnish voters may prove as great a threat to the euro region’s retooled bailout plan as German taxpayers.

Support for the anti-euro True Finns party has soared as an April 17 election nears. It’s the fastest-growing movement in the northernmost euro member, with opinion-poll backing to rival the nation’s biggest opposition party. Voters are rallying to its argument that Europe shouldn’t have rescued Greece or Ireland, and Finland should veto more cash for the bailout fund.

“How come they can’t see the euro doesn’t work?” Timo Soini, leader of the True Finns, said in a Feb. 24 phone interview. “If a melon and an apple each wear the same size baseball cap, everyone can see that just doesn’t work.”"

Krækja: Finns Threaten Debt Bailout Plan as Election Nears: Euro Credit - Businessweek:

France24 - French foreign minister quits after miserable term in office

"France's beleaguered Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie has tendered her resignation in a letter to President Nicolas Sarkozy, ending a brief term marked by a series of gaffes related to the recent uprising in Tunisia."

Krækja, frétt og myndskeið: France24 - French foreign minister quits after miserable term in office:

Iceland-Ireland Again - Paul Krugman - NYTimes.com

"Iceland-Ireland Again
Via the Irish Economy, I see that there have been two articles in the Irish Times comparing Iceland and Ireland, and concluding that Iceland did no better. The articles aren’t bad — but need to be read with caution. Specifically, I’d make four counter-arguments . . .

Lesa áfram -> krækja: Iceland-Ireland Again - NYTimes.com:

Eldra, um Ísland frá Paul Krugman

Iceland-Ireland Again - February 26, 2011
Comparative Peripheral Suffering - February 1, 2011
Bloomberg on the Icelandic Miracle - February 1, 2011
Hard Currencies, Soft Heads - December 21, 2010
The Hard (Money) Men - December 8, 2010
Ice And Fire Update - December 7, 2010
Ireland Agonistes - December 2, 2010
One Size Doesn’t Fit - November 26, 2010
Lands of Ice and Ire - November 24, 2010
Ireland/Spain Update - September 17, 2010
The Icelandic Post-crisis Miracle - June 30, 2010
They Have Made a Desert - May 14, 2010
Austria - April 15, 2009
Capital control memories - March 2, 2009
The plot against Iceland - April 9, 2008

Sinnemäki’s blog written by assistant- Helsinki Times

“MINISTER of Labour Anni Sinnemäki’s (Greens) latest blog entry was written by her special assistant, it has been revealed. The blog, written in Sinnemäki’s name, comments on the taxation plans of the Social Democratic Party.

Krækja: Sinnemäki’s blog written by assistant

Samfylkingar fólk lofsyngur ESB með innantómum tölfræðirunum; Evrópuvaktin

Evrópuvaktin skrifar um hina heiðarlegu og "upplýstu umræðu" Samfylkingarmanna:

Þá fór Anna Margrét með gamla rullu um styrk til Finna að sögn Sigmundar Ernis og nefndi þá 300 milljónir evra til sögunnar á sjö árum gegn sambærilegri fjárhæð frá finnskum stjórnvöldum. Þessar tölur segja að sjálfsögðu ekkert annað en um það sem gildir í Finnlandi þar sem aðstæður eru allt aðrar og erfiðari en hér landi. Þá segir Sigmundur Ernir:

„Svo er rúsínan í evrópska pylsuendanum þessi: Finnski samningurinn við ESB um jaðarsvæði færir þeim röska 5 milljarða evra styrk til harðbýlla svæða norðan 62. breiddargráðu. Til viðbótar við allt hitt sem að ofan greinir

Krækja: Samfylkingarfólk lofsyngur ESB með innantómum tölfræðirunum

PS: Finnland hefur aldrei fengið neina fjármuni frá Evrópusambandinu öll árin sem það hefur verið í því, nema árið 2000 en þá fékk landið 45,52 miljónir evra nettó-greiddar frá ESB eða sem svarar til 8,8 evrur á mann eða 0,03 prósent af landsframleiðslu Finnlands. Frá árinu 1995 til 2009 hefur Evrópusambandsaðildin kostað Finnland 4,361 miljarða evrur, eða 692 miljarða íslenskar krónur. Þessi upphæð mun fara hratt hækkandi.

Hér er greiðslujöfnuður Finnlands við Evrópusambandið

Mynd: nettójöfnuður Finnlands gagnvart Evrópusambandinu frá 1995 til 2009

Það er tékkneski hagfræðingurinn Petr Mach, sem er fyrrverandi efnahagslegur ráðgjafi forseta Tékklands sem tekið hefur saman tölurnar og ná þær yfir öll lönd Evrópusambandsins og allar greiðslur til og frá löndunum öll árin. Hér er heimasíða Petr Mach og hér er hægt að skoða samsvarandi tölur fyrir öll lönd ESB frá upphafi: www.money-go-round.eu

Krækja: Sigmundur Ernir Rúnarsson þingmaður Samfylkingarinnar flytur ræðu á Alþingi Íslendinga

"The Absolute Return Letter" - febrúar 2011

Kína

Mynd; Financial Times, IMF

"If spending an amount equal to half of the world’s second largest GDP to buy up foreign currencies is not currency manipulation, then what is?"

Martin Wolf, Financial Times

Ég mæli með "The Absolute Return Letter" fyrir febrúar mánuð 2011, frá Absolute Return Partners LLP og eftir Niels C. Jensen: www.arpllp.com

Lissabon markmið ESB sem upprunalega áttu að tryggja líf evrunnar eru í molum og menn hafa ekkert lært af reynslunni

Europe’s Competitiveness Shell Game; Ann Mettler

BRUSSELS – For seasoned observers of Europe’s economy, the most recent European Union summit delivered a bizarre sense of déjà vu. Little more than a decade ago, European leaders announced to great fanfare the “Lisbon Agenda,” a policy blueprint to make Europe “the most competitive, knowledge-based economy in the world.” The new “Competitiveness Pact,” proposed at the EU summit by France and Germany, did not make the same pretensions to global grandeur, but was instead sold as a step required to ensure the survival of the euro.
. . .
Unfortunately, however, government leaders have apparently learned nothing from the lessons of the failed Lisbon Agenda. Indeed, the current plans seem doomed to fail for two reasons.

Krækja; Europe’s Competitiveness Shell Game by Ann Mettler - Project Syndicate

PS: Svona fóru Lissabon 2000 markmið ESB, sem er síðasta 10 ára áætlun Evrópusambandsins: Lissabon 2000 markmið Evrópusambandsins

Vaxtakostnaður portúgalska ríkisins í hæstu hæðum, yfir 7,5 prósent

Mynd Bloomberg; Þróun vaxtakostnaðar portúgalska ríkisins í myntbandalagi Evrópusambandsins: Vextir á 10 ára lánum til ríkisins. 

Vaxtakostnaður portúgalska ríkisins fór í allra tíma hæstu hæðir í gær, 24 feb 2011, og er nú sögulega hár og hærri en hann hefur verið frá janúar 1997. Lánshæfnismatslækkun S&P bíður nú ríkissjóðs. Áhættan við að lána portúgalska ríkinu peninga í 10 ár hefur ekki, af fjárfestum, verið átilin meiri en hún er nú. Mynt Portúgals er evra Evrópusambandsins.

Verðbólga í Portúgal mældist 3,60% í janúar sem gerir raunstýrivexti seðlabanka Evrópusambandsins í Portúgal neikvæða. Raunstýrivextir = stýrivextir mínus verðbólga

Wall Street Journal skrifar

"LISBON (Dow Jones)--Portugal's Treasury and Government Debt Agency has announced a reverse auction for March 2, the second in two weeks, aiming to buy back two government bond lines maturing in the second quarter, and easing pressure on the country to seek a possible bailout.

The buyback, however, could follow a possible downgrade on Portugal's sovereign ratings by Standard & Poor's, which is expected to review its decision to put the country under creditwatch negative by the end of this month.

In November, S&P put the nation's A- long-term rating, which is four notches into investment-grade territory, on watch for downgrade, citing economic pressures and increased risks to the government's creditworthiness. It said then it would review the creditwatch within the next three months."

2nd UPDATE: Portugal To Buy Back Bonds As Funding Costs Bite - WSJ.com:

Fólksflótti frá Írlandi - Wall Street Journal

Reikna með að 2,5 af hverjum hundrað Írum yfirgefi land sitt á næstu 24 mánuðum



Irish Workers Leave the Emerald Isle
The great recession has triggered yet another wave of Irish emigration. WSJ's Don Duncan reports on how that is playing out in the national election.

Þjóðverjum hefur fækkað um 630 þúsund manns á fjórum árum

2010-árbók hagstofu Þýskalands er komin út.

Öldrunarhagkerfi

Mynd 1; úr árbókinni: þýski aldurspíramídinn er smám saman að snúast á hvolf og er svo étinn upp innanfrá af mannfjölda sem er af erlendu bergi brotinn. Framtíðarspá hagstofunnar gerir ráð fyrir að aðeins 60-65 milljón manns búi í Þýskalandi árið 2060.

Mynd 2; úr mannfjöldaspálíkani þýsku hagstofunnar. Forsenda: frjósemi 1,2 lifandi fætt barn á hverja konu fram til 2060 (fertility rate). Fólksfækkun: 18 milljón manns frá 2005 til 2060.



Graf 3; Sögulegt frjósemi þýskra og japanskra kvenna (fertility rate) frá 1960 til 2008. Fjöldi lifandi fæddra barna á æfi hverrar konu.

The Low fertility trap

Þekkið þið þessi einkenni?

eftir Edward Hugh

1. Ongoing weaknesses in domestic consumer demand
2. absence of housing booms (since 1995 in the European cases)
3. Comparatively high rates of personal saving, which then begin to decline
4. Increasing structural dependence on exports for growth
5. Lack of attractiveness as a destination for migrants
6. An increasingly flat wages curve (across time) despite demographically driven labour market tightening
7. Growing government deficit issues and dilemma's about how to fund
8. health and pension systems, with a tendency to try and load the cost onto the tax system rather than reducing provision. Lesa áfram 

Lýsing: Low Fertility Trap
Skilgreining: PDF og glærur

Skrif Edwards Hugh

How low can fertility fall?

- The possible ‘low fertility trap’ hypothesis

- Observation that countries that fell below fertility level of 1.5 children have not recovered.

- Negative demographic momentum: Because of past low fertility there will be fewer potential mothers in the future.

- Economics: Gap between aspirations for consumption and expected income widens for young people due to negative consequences of ageing (cuts in social security systems, possible economic stagnation)

- Ideational change: Young people are socialized in an environment with few children and this may result in lower ideal family size in next generation.

• The Low-Fertility Trap (AFOE)
• Population, The Ultimate Non-renewable Resource

Evran vandamál en ekki lausn - mbl.is

Evran er hluti af vandamálinu en ekki hluti af lausninni á efnahagskreppunni í Evrópu. Kreppan er ekki aðeins efnahagslegs eðlis heldur er hún einnig af pólitískum toga. Þetta segir sænski þingmaðurinn Jonas Sjöstedt.

Krækja: Evran vandamál en ekki lausn - mbl.is

Knight Capital: a sovereign roadmap - Catalyst Calendar February 2011

Catalyst Calendar - February 2011

Nánar: Brutal March | Peripheral Europe - Update

Andríki - Vefþjóðviljinn - Fimmtudagur 24. febrúar 2011 - Áhættumat og áhættustýring

"Tryggvi Þór Herbertsson alþingismaður var gestur síðdegis á Útvarpi Sögu í gær. Þar fræddi hann hlustendur um girnilegan innmat í eignasafni þrotahús Landsbankans. Mátti víða sjá bílstjóra sleikja út um í síðdegistraffíkinni þegar þegar lýsingar á þessum kræsingum bárust í viðtæki þeirra. Tryggvi telur að eignir þrotabúsins séu svo traustar að einungis muni falla 47 þúsund milljónir króna (í erlendri mynt) á íslenska skattgreiðendur vegna Icesave. Þá spurðu stjórnendur þáttarins hvort Bretum og Hollendingum hefði ekki verið boðið að hirða eignasafnið og fá eingreiðslu upp á 47 þúsund milljónir króna frá Íslendingum.

Jú þeim var boðið það, svaraði Tryggvi. En þeir höfnuðu því vegna þess að þeir kærðu sig ekki um áhættuna sem í því felst!"

Krækja:Andríki - Vefþjóðviljinn

Grikkland - evrusvæðið: Anti-austerity protests spark violent clashes in Greece- France24

Clashes broke out between riot police and protesters Wednesday during a massive anti-austerity march in Athens,leaving three police injured - one after being set on fire by a Molotov cocktail.

The heavy use of tear gas broke apart a demonstration that had rallied some 18,000 protesters in the capital according to police, and over 60,000 according to union organisers.

At least 36,000 people according to police took part in protests held in Athens, Thessaloniki and the port of Piraeus to reject economic policies dictated by Greece's narrow bankruptcy rescue by the EU and the IMF last year.

"Nobody believes in the government and in the (austerity) plan," said Yiannis Albanis, a computer technician joining the protest."





Krækja: France24

Breyting skuldatryggingaálags síðustu 6-7 daga

Skuldatryggingaálag í afleiðuviðskiptum með 5 ára ríkisskuldabréf 

Land/tímabil	Frá 16. feb 2011	Til 23. feb 2011	Breyting pt.
Spánn	247	264	+17
Portúgal	450	476	+26
Grikkland	885	929	+44
Írland	585	596	+11
Ítalía	175	185	+10
Ísland*	224	245	+21
* 22. feb.

Heimild: Bloomberg | Keldan

Kirkjan: Den danske Folkekirke - Danmarks Statistik

Flere små sogne

1. oktober 2010 blev de hidtidige kirkedistrikter udskilt som selvstændige sogne. Antallet af sogne i CPR er vokset med 71 til 2.187 i 2010. Især antallet af de mindre sogne er vokset. Der opstod således 79 flere sogne med under 1.000 indbyggere sam- tidig med, at antallet med mindst 1.000 indbyggere faldt med 8. En mindre andel af de nye sogne er endnu ikke registreret i CPR og er derfor ikke medtaget i denne opgørelse.

Krækja: PDF - Flere små sogne

Slovakia’s jobless rate climbs close to 13 percent in January - The Slovak Spectator

13 prósent atvinnuleysi í Slóvakíu

"Slovakia's unemployment rate in January reached record-high figures for the post-crisis period at 12.98 percent, an annual increase of 0.52 percentage points, the Labour, Social Affairs and Family Office (ÚPSVaR) stated on February 21 as reported by the TASR newswire."

Slovakia’s jobless rate climbs close to 13 percent in January - The Slovak Spectator:

Slóvakía tók upp evru þann 1. janúar 2009. 

Helsinki Times: Angry young men seduced by True Finns

"Of the party’s new supporters, about a third are former supporters of the Finnish Rural Party (SMP). Small entrepreneurs, workers who used to vote for the Social Democrats and people who have abstained from voting in previous elections are the most visible new supporters of the True Finns."

Angry young men seduced by True Finns

FT.com - Greek police clash with anti-austerity protesters

"Greek riot police fired teargas at protesters who threw stones and petrol bombs as a demonstration against austerity measures by striking workers erupted in violence."

FT.com / Brussels / Economy - Greek police clash with anti-austerity protesters:

Statistics Finland; Unemployment rate 8.2 per cent in January

8,2 prósent atvinnuleysi í Finnlandi í janúar

Atvinnuástand í Finnlandi hefur aldrei jafnað sig eftir hrunið og ESB inngöngu landsins í kjölfarið. Atvinnuleysi hefur verið mikið og strangt allar götur frá 1993.

Hagstofa Finnlands: Unemployment rate and trend of unemployment rate 1989/01 – 2011/01

According to Statistics Finland’s Labour Force Survey, the number of unemployed persons in January was 215,000, which is 35,000 lower than one year ago. At 8.2 per cent, the unemployment rate was 1.4 percentage points lower than one year earlier. There were 43,000 more employed persons than in January of the previous year.

Krækja: Statistics Finland - Labour force survey:


2009: Mesti efnahagssamdráttur í Finnlandi síðan 1918

Landsframleiðsla Finnlands féll um hvorki meira né minna en 7,8% (leiðréttar tölur hagstofunnar segja 8%) á árinu 2009 í heild. Þetta er mesta hrun í landsframleiðslu Finnlands á einu ári frá því að mælingar hófust árið 1975. Í frægu finnsku kreppunni 1991-1993, þegar Finnland upplifði erfiða bankakreppu samhliða hruni Sovétríkjanna, þá féll landsframleiðsla Finnlands "aðeins" um 6% á árinu 1991, þegar verst lét. Til að fá fram tölur um svipað hrun og varð á árinu 2008-2009, þá þurfa Finnar að leita aftur til áranna 1917-1918. Það er víst óþarft að segja frá því hér að mynt Finnlands heitir og er því miður evra myntbandalags Evrópusambandsins. En ég segi það samt, já einu sinni enn.

Útflutningur Finnlands hrundi alls um 24% frá 2008-2009, fjárfestingar hrundu um 13%, innflutningur hrundi um 22% og einkaneysla féll um 2,1%. Rekstrarafkoma fyrirtækja hrundi um 39%. Þau greiddu því 44% minna í skatta og greiddu út 34% minna í arð; Hagstofa Finnlands

Arbejdsløsheden bider sig fast | Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd

Atvinnuleysi í Danmörku bítur sig fast

Fjöldi lausra starfa í Danmörku; Skýrsla Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd

Ifølge arbejdskraftundersøgelsen (AKU) for fjerde kvartal 2010 faldt beskæftigelsen med 17000 personer (sæsonkorrigeret - samtidig er arbejdsløsheden steget næsten tilsvarende med 18000 fra tredje til fjerde kvartal 2010 - det er en overraskende stor stigning i arbejdsløsheden, der nu ifølge AKU er på 7,4 pct.

Krækja: Arbejdsløsheden bider sig fast | Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd

FT.com / Comment / Analysis - Ireland: A vote in a void

Tiger has fallen. The debate was dubbed: “Ireland – A Broken Dream?”

. . .

"Like other small countries, it has traditionally looked to the Commission as its protector. But the Commission’s relative power is in decline. The European parliament is increasingly powerful, but only 12 of its 736 members are Irish. Meanwhile, the first full-time president of the European Council, which unites EU governments, is Herman Van Rompuy, a Belgian perceived in Dublin to be instinctively close to France and Germany.

. . .

In the short term, Ireland appears to have almost no freedom of manoeuvre. EU authorities rule out bondholder write-downs for the present because of the risk of creating a funding crisis for banks across the eurozone. "

Krækja: FT.com / Comment / Analysis - Ireland: A vote in a void:

Return to the Drachma?: Economists Warn Greece May Have to Quit Euro - SPIEGEL ONLINE

"Greece's debts are rising rapidly despite radical austerity measures. Now a group of leading European economists has warned that creditors might have to write off more than 30 percent of their loans. Greece might even have to reintroduce the drachma to overcome its debt crisis, they argue.

The European Economic Advisory Group (EEAG), a group of leading European economists, has warned that Greece may need another bailout by 2013 at the latest."

[..]

New Worries About Portugal, Spain

Krækja: Return to the Drachma?: Economists Warn Greece May Have to Quit Euro - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International:

FT.com - Ireland needs help with its debt

What caused this calamity?

As Philip Lane of Trinity College notes: “There was a genuine Irish economic miracle, with very rapid output, employment and productivity growth during the 1994-2000 period.” Without entry into the eurozone, this might have petered out. But the fall in interest rates increased the risk that a credit-fuelled property bubble would emerge. So, indeed, it did.

Prof Lane observes: “The flavour of this boom was very different to the ‘Celtic Tiger’ years. In particular, it was dominated by a surge in construction activity.” Moreover, this “expansion in property investment was fuelled by rapid credit expansion”, not just to the household sector, but also to a “small group of property developers”."

FT.com / Comment & analysis / FT Columnists - Ireland needs help with its debt: "

Open Europe blog: Ostrich banking tests

Álagspróf á bankakerfi evrusvæðis

"Remember the EU's banking 'stress tests', which were supposed to determine the health of the key financial institutions across Europe? The tests, that were published last summer, infamously cleared all Irish banks. Only a couple of months later, two of these banks were forced too seek help from the Irish state to avoid bankruptcy, which in turn forced Ireland to apply for a bail-out."

Krækja: Open Europe blog: Ostrich banking tests