The aim of this paper is to assess to what extent Germany - whether by accident or design - has been a beneficiary of the Euro era, and what negative impact, if any, there has been on the Eurozone’s smaller economies.
Analysis shows that trade imbalances within the Eurozone centre upon Germany, the most important economy, and by far the largest exporting nation. Germany has substantial trade and current account surpluses with the other Eurozone members. In the last three recorded years for example, it was €114.3 billion in 2007, and €104.5 billion and €79.7 billion in the recession years of 2008 and 2009 respectively.
This situation is greatly exacerbated by the ECB’s exchange rate policy which (wittingly or not) favours German interests. This is because, at the outset, the German people gave up their beloved D-Mark under an implicit agreement that EMU would never lead to inflation in their country. For this reason the European Central Bank tightens monetary policy whenever the German economy is in danger of over-heating, regardless of the needs of the Mediterranean economies.
When the Euro was founded in 1999, it was fondly assumed that with Germany’s exchange rate ‘irrevocably fixed’, then there would be no more periodic crises such as those which repeatedly afflicted the ERM between 1979 and 1992. The ruling elite, now in total control, could sit back smugly anticipating economic convergence and the facilitation of political union, however ill-defined this concept is and no matter how unwanted.
It was never going to happen like this. Rather, German exchange rate policy, within the Euro, represents the most lethal danger to the survivability of the Single Currency. The fundamental reason for this is stark in its simplicity.
